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 1 Introduction  
 
"Death is the constant shadow that haunts the ex-mine workers as they struggle for 
compensation."1 Linked to this are the poor working conditions that South African 
miners find themselves in.2 This is evident from the statistics of workers who die in 
accidents underground, while thousands more die of work-related diseases such as 
silicosis,3 which is a debilitating disease that causes scarring and shrinking of the 
lungs, destroying the breathing ability of people who suffer from it.4 Excessive 
exposure to dust and asbestos results in asbestosis and silicosis, which remain 
major causes of premature retirement and death among South African miners.5 
 
Against this background, safety and health at work lie at the heart of the system of 
social security. The occupational health and safety system plays a crucial role in 
protecting employees against occupational injuries and diseases in their workplace. 
In fact, the occupational health and safety system has far-reaching implications for 
the contract of employment as well as in the lives of individuals, their families and 
communities. Recently, a number of scholars have addressed the impact of silicosis 
and asbestosis on the lives of mineworkers in South Africa.6 
 
                                                 
*  Clarence Tshoose. LLB, LLM (North-West University). Senior Lecturer in Mercantile Law, 
College of Law, University of South Africa. E-Mail:tshooci@unisa.ac.za. The author would like to 
thank Ella Belcher (Chris Kapp Associates) and Jackie Viljoen for their editorial assistance in 
preparing this contribution. 
1  York 2011 www.republicofmining.com. 
2  SIMRAC 2003 researchspace.csir.co.za 24. 
3  SIMRAC 2003 researchspace.csir.co.za 24. 
4  Anonymous Date Unknonw jxzy.smu.edu.cn. 
5  SIMRAC 2003 researchspace.csir.co.za 24. 
6  McCulloch 2009 African Affairs 238-240; Ehrlich "Body as history"; Meeran 2003 IJOEH 218-227; 
Roberts Hidden Epidemic 32-39; Hermanus 2007 SAIMM 532-537. 
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The purpose of this case note is to analyse critically the judgment of Mankayi v 
AngloGold Ashanti,7 and to consider its implications for the system of occupational 
health and safety in South Africa. In this analysis, the main question is whether or 
not section 35(1) of COIDA,8 which excluded Mankayi from its scope of application, 
is constitutional. The contribution will analyse the decision of the Constitutional Court 
which dealt with the interpretation of section 100(2) of the ODIMWA9 and section 
35(1) of COIDA.10 
 
As a precursor, it is important to provide an overview of the Mankayi case for the 
discussion that follows. This will be done by analysing important legislation which 
plays a key role in occupational health and safety. Secondly, the case note will 
examine the system of compensation under the occupational health and safety 
legislation. Thirdly, the case note will be preceded by a short discussion of 
jurisdiction and prescription. Thereafter a discussion of the Mankayi case follows. As 
a point of departure, it will be argued that the decision of the Constitutional Court has 
far-reaching implications for the future of occupational health and safety, and in 
particular for the employer's liability for occupational injuries and diseases in mines. 
2 Brief overview of the Mankayi case 
The Constitutional Court in Mankayi v AngloGold Ashanti11 pondered the issue of the 
mineworkers' right to compensation. Firstly, the Court had to consider the provisions 
of section 100(2) of ODIMWA, which excluded Mankayi from claiming benefits under 
COIDA. Secondly, the Court had to decide whether section 35(1) of COIDA12 limits 
the right of mineworkers to recover damages for occupational injury sustained or 
disease contracted during the course of employment. 
 
                                                 
7  Mankayi v AngloGold Ashanti 2011 32 ILJ 545 (CC) (hereafter referred to as the Mankayi case). 
8  Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 (as amended by Act 61 of 
1997). 
9  Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act 78 of 1973 (hereafter referred to as ODIMWA). 
10  Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 (hereafter referred to as 
COIDA). 
11  Mankayi case. 
12  Section 35(1) COIDA states that no action shall lie by an employee or any dependant of an 
employee for the recovery of damages in respect of any occupational injury or disease resulting 
in the disablement or death of such employee against such employee's employer, and no liability 
for compensation on the part of such employer shall arise save under the provisions of this Act in 
respect of such disablement or death. 
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It is against this background and on this basis (as discussed above) that the 
Applicant (Thembekile Mankayi) challenged the findings of both the South Gauteng 
High Court13and the Supreme Court of Appeal14 in which section 35(1) of COIDA 
was interpreted as extinguishing the mineworkers' common-law right to sue the 
employer for occupational injuries sustained and diseases contracted during the 
course of employment, while protecting the employer against claims arising from 
non-compliance with the common-law duties of the employer, such as the duty to 
provide a safe working environment.  
 
Judge Boshoff, in Van Deventer v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,15 
summarised an employer's duty as follows: 
 
An employer owes a common law duty to a workman to take reasonable 
care for his safety. The question arises in each particular case what 
reasonable care is required. This is a question of fact and depends upon 
the circumstances of each particular case. A master [employer] is in the first 
place under a duty to see that his servants [employees] do not suffer through 
his personal negligence, such as failure to provide a safe working 
environment and a failure to provide [a] proper and suitable plant, if he knows 
or ought to have known of such failure. 
 
The MHSA further places a duty on an employer to provide a safe working 
environment, and this duty is subject to the concept "reasonably practicable", 
which is defined in the Act. 
 
In terms of the MHSA, the employer at a mine being worked at must ensure 
safety at the mine without risk to the health of employees and persons who 
may be affected by the activities at the mine. The MHSA also states that the 
appointment of a manager does not relieve the employer of any duty imposed 
on him by the MHSA or any other law. Furthermore, if no manager is appointed, the 
employer must himself perform the functions of the manager. 
 
                                                 
13  Mankayi v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd Case No. 06/22312, South Gauteng High Court, 
Johannesburg, 26 June 2008, unreported. 
14  Mankayi v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2010 5 SA 137 (SCA). This case was overruled by the 
Constitutional Court on appeal. 
15  Van Deventer v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1962 4 SA 28 (T). 
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2.1 The facts 
 
In the present case, the Applicant had been employed as an underground 
mineworker by the Respondent (AngloGold Ashanti Limited) for 16 years from 1979 
to 1995. In his particulars of claim the Applicant alleged that during his employment 
the Respondent had negligently exposed him to harmful dusts and gases as a result 
of which he contracted diseases in the form of tuberculosis and chronic obstructive 
airways disease, which had rendered him unable to work as a mineworker or in any 
other occupation. 
 
After being certified as suffering from a compensatable disease, the Applicant 
received R16 320.00 from the Compensation Commissioner in terms of ODIMWA. In 
enforcing his common-law right, the Applicant issued summons against the 
Respondent. He claimed damages in the sum of about R2.6 million. This comprised 
past and future loss of earnings of R738 147.14, future medical expenses of R1 374 
600.00 and general damages of R500 000.00 (which included pain and suffering). 
 
In the light of the above facts in the Mankayi case, both the High Court and the 
Supreme Court of Appeal ruled that the Applicant was barred by section 35(1) of the 
COIDA from instituting a delictual claim against his former employer, the 
Respondent. In fact, the Respondent raised a technical point, that the Applicant was 
barred by the operation of section 35(1) of COIDA from instituting a claim for 
damages against the Respondent. Section 35(1) of COIDA provides that: 
 
an employee or any other dependent of an employee is precluded from recovering 
any damages in respect of any occupational injury or disease resulting in the 
disablement or death of such employee from such employee's employer. Section 
35(1) also provides that no liability for compensation shall arise against an 
employer, except under COIDA. 
 
In this case, the Respondent raised exception to the Applicant's claim, arguing that 
section 35(1) of COIDA barred the Applicant from claiming damages. The 
Respondent's exception was upheld by the High Court. The Applicant appealed the 
judgment of the High Court to the Supreme Court of Appeal. On appeal, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal found that section 35(1) of COIDA extinguished all 
common-law claims for damages for any occupational injury or disease resulting in 
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the disablement or death of an employee and, consequently, that the Applicant's 
claim was excluded by s 35(1) (discussed above). In short, the Applicant's appeal 
was unanimously dismissed by the SCA bench. As a result, the Applicant 
approached the Constitutional Court on the following basis.  Firstly, to determine 
whether section 100(2) of ODIMWA precludes the Applicant from claiming 
compensation under COIDA. It is important to note that section 100(2) provides that 
no person who has a claim to benefits, under ODIMWA, in respect of a 
compensatable disease, as defined in ODIMWA, on the ground that such person is 
or was employed at a controlled mine, shall be entitled, in respect of such disease, to 
benefits under COIDA, or any other law. Secondly, the Constitutional Court had to 
determine whether section 35(1) of COIDA includes employees covered by 
ODIMWA, notwithstanding that they are barred from claiming benefits under COIDA; 
and the abrogation of the common-law right of action envisaged by section 35(1) of 
COIDA. 
 
2.2 The decision of the Constitutional Court: Some preliminary remarks on 
prescription and jurisdiction 
 
2.2.1 Prescription 
 
In the Mankayi case the Court was silent on the Prescription Act.16 However, it is 
important to give a brief overview of some of the relevant provisions of the Act 
which have some relevance to this case. The Prescription Act has the effect of 
extinguishing a debt after the lapse of a specified period. A debt in the context 
under discussion refers to the Applicant's claim for damages. The relevant period 
in this regard is three years.17 The question often arises when prescription 
commences. Must a plaintiff know all the facts on which his/her claim is based 
before prescription commences? Section 12 of the Prescription Act provides that 
prescription shall commence to run "as soon as the debt is due".18 However, if 
the defendant (a debtor) wilfully prevents the plaintiff (a creditor) from coming to 
know of the existence of the debt (the claim), prescription shall not commence to 
                                                 
16  Prescription Act 68 of 1969 (hereafter referred to as the Prescription Act). 
17  Section 11 Prescription Act. 
18  Section 12(1) Prescription Act. 
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run until the plaintiff becomes aware of the existence of the claim.19 In Truter and 
Another v Deysel,20 the court per Van Heerden, JA held inter alia as follows: 
 
For the purposes of the Act, the term "debt due" means a debt, including a delictual 
debt, which is owing and payable. A debt is due in this sense when the creditor 
acquires a complete cause of action for the recovery of the debt, i.e. when the 
entire set of facts which the creditor must prove in order to succeed with his or her 
claim against the debtor is in place or, in other words, when everything has 
happened which would entitle the creditor to institute action and to pursue his or her 
claim. 
 
Even though the Constitutional Court was silent on the issue of prescription, it is 
clear that the Mankayi case falls within the statutory confines of the Prescription 
Act, because the Applicant in his particulars of claim alleged that in 1993 and in 
1999 he was diagnosed as suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis and that in 
August 2006 he was informed that he had contracted silicosis and obstructive 
airways disease. In my opinion, the discussion on the Prescription Act gives 
some guidelines on the time frames required by our law for a party to institute a 
claim against an employer. 
 
2.2.2 Jurisdiction  
 
The Constitutional Court was called upon to decide if it had jurisdiction to 
entertain this matter. In analysing the question of jurisdiction, the Court remarked 
that in a system of constitutional supremacy it is inappropriate to construe the 
concept of what is a "constitutional matter" narrowly. According to the Court, a 
constitutional matter involves the following:21 
 
(a) the interpretation, application or upholding of the Constitution itself, (b) the 
development of (or the failure to develop) the common law in accordance with the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights, (c) a statute that conflicts with a 
requirement or restriction imposed by the Constitution, (d) the interpretation of a 
statute in accordance with the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights (or the 
failure to do so), (e) the erroneous interpretation or application of legislation that has 
been enacted to give effect to a constitutional right or in compliance with the 
legislature's constitutional responsibilities, or (f) executive or administrative action 
that conflicts with a requirement or restriction imposed by the Constitution. 
                                                 
19  Section 12(2) Prescription Act. 
20  Truter v Deysel 2006 4 SA 168 (SCA). 
21  Mankayi case. 
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In addition, as Khampepe J remarked, it is in the interest of justice that an 
authoritative interpretation be given to a statutory provision that is claimed to 
curtail an employee's common-law right to recover compensation for the harm 
suffered in consequence of an employer's negligence. This is so where the 
employee is not entitled to claim the benefits under that statute and can claim 
only seemingly paltry benefits under a different statute.22 Froneman J, in 
delivering her reasons for granting leave to appeal, argued that the mere fact that 
this case concerns the interpretation of a statute is sufficient to bring it within the 
Constitutional Court's jurisdiction.23 Froneman states: 
 
This constitutional injunction makes it impossible to interpret any legislation other 
than through the prism of the Bill of Rights. Statutory interpretation is thus inevitably 
a constitutional matter. It is a legal issue which necessarily involves the evaluation 
of social and policy choices reflected in legislation. 
 
With reference to Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and Another: 
In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa and Others,24 the Court 
observed that there is only one system of law. It is shaped by the Constitution, 
which is the supreme law, and all law, including the common law, derives its 
force from the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the 
Constitution) and is subject to constitutional control. The Court further noted the 
decision in S v Boesak,25 and Fraser v Absa Bank Ltd (National Director) Public 
Prosecutions as Amicus Curiae,26 and held that there are non-exhaustive 
instances of what constitute constitutional matters. The Constitutional Court 
further held that a constitutional matter can among other things include all 
questions of law which are derived from the Constitution.27 
 
This approach to interpretation adopted by the Court suggests that as far as 
constitutional interpretation is concerned, South Africa is undergoing a 
                                                 
22  Mankayi case para 21. 
23  Mankayi case paras 117-118. 
24  Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of 
South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 44. 
25  S v Boesak 2001 1 SA 912 (CC) paras 10-5. 
26  Fraser v Absa Bank Ltd (National Director); Public Prosecutions as Amicus Curiae 2007 3 SA 
484 (CC) paras 35-47. 
27  Mankayi case para 125. 
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transformation from a formal, positivistic vision of law to a substantive, natural 
law vision of law. 
 
2.3 Analysis of and comment on the Mankayi case 
 
In the judgment delivered by Ngcobo CJ, Moseneke DCJ, Brand AJ, Cameron J, 
Froneman J, Mogoeng J, Nkabinde J, Skweyiya J and Yacoob J, the 
Constitutional Court overturned the previous judgment of the Labour Court and 
the Supreme Court of Appeal where it was held that section 35 of COIDA 
extinguishes the common-law right of mineworkers to recover damages for 
occupational injury or disease from negligent mine owners under COIDA. The 
South Gauteng High Court (High Court)28 and the Supreme Court of Appeal29 
interpreted section 35(1) of COIDA as extinguishing the mineworkers' common-
law claim and extending the protection against common-law liability to mine 
owners. 
 
The Constitutional Court held that section 35(1), while excluding the common-law 
right of employees to sue the employer for damages in respect of occupational 
injury or disease, covers only employees who are entitled to claim under COIDA. 
Mineworkers excluded in terms of ODIMWA from claiming against their employer 
under COIDA for compensatable diseases in a controlled mine are not covered 
by section 35(1). 
 
In justifying the conclusion it reached, the Court premised its argument on 
section 39(2) of the Constitution, which provides that a court must, when 
interpreting any legislation, promote the spirit, purport and objectives of the Bill of 
Rights. The Court per Froneman J30 reasoned that the interpretation given to 
section 35(1) of the COIDA in the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal has 
the effect of abolishing a common-law right which protected and provided an 
appropriate remedy to the fundamental right to freedom and security of the 
person in terms of section 12(1) of the Constitution. One of the main issues 
                                                 
28  Mankayi v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd Case No 06/22312, South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg, 
26 June 2008, unreported. 
29  Mankayi v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2010 5 SA 137 (SCA). 
30  Mankayi case para 120. 
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examined by the Court was the question of whether COIDA applies to employees 
covered by section 100(2) of ODIMWA, and whether the exclusionary and 
extinguishing effect of section 35(1) applies only to employees who have a claim 
for compensation under COIDA in respect of the occupational disease suffered 
by Mankayi. The Constitutional Court remarked that the meaning of the word 
"employee" in section 1 of COIDA covers employees such as the Applicant, who 
are entitled to claim for occupational diseases under COIDA and who may 
become entitled to claim benefits for compensatable diseases under ODIMWA.31 
 
The Court also acknowledged that various provisions indicated that COIDA also 
applies to employees in controlled mines and works. The definition of the words 
"employee" and "employer" respectively do not expressly exclude employees 
who could have a claim for compensation under ODIMWA. ODIMWA provides 
statutory compensation for designated compensatable diseases contracted at 
controlled mines and works. 
 
Apart from providing compensation for occupational injuries, COIDA also 
provides for statutory compensation in respect of a number of listed occupational 
diseases32 contracted by employees in the course of their employment and 
resulting in disablement or death. The diseases that constitute "compensatable 
diseases" under ODIMWA overlap with the diseases that constitute occupational 
diseases under COIDA. In the case of the Applicant, the disease which he had 
contracted could fall within both COIDA and ODIMWA, but section 100(2) of 
ODIMWA precludes him from claiming under COIDA. For the disablement set out 
in his particulars of claim, he is restricted to his ODIMWA remedy and is not 
entitled to a COIDA claim. 
 
                                                 
31  Mankayi case para 72. 
32  Section 1 COIDA defines "occupational diseases" as any disease contemplated in s 65(1)(a) or 
(b). S 65(1)(a) refers to Schedule 3. Schedule 3 lists occupational diseases to include, inter alia, 
the following respiratory diseases: 
(i) Pneumoconiosis-fibrosis of the parenchyma of the lung caused by fibrogenic dust; 
(ii) Pleural thickening caused by asbestos dust exposure; 
(iii) Silicotuberculosis; 
(iv) Bronchopulmonary diseases caused by hard-metal dust; 
(v) Bronchopulmonary diseases caused by cotton, flax, hemp or sisal dusts (byssinosis);and 
(vi) Chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases. 
CI TSHOOSE                                                                            PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
 
242 / 261 
 
Furthermore, the Court also considered the impact of section 100(2) of ODIMWA 
on the definition of "employee" and the use of that word in section 35(1) of 
COIDA which provides: 
 
… substitution of compensation for other legal remedies ... No action shall lie by an 
employee or any dependant of an employee for the recovery of damages in respect 
of any occupational injury or disease resulting in the disablement or death of such 
employee against such employee's employer, and no liability for compensation on 
the part of such employer shall arise save under the provisions of this Act in respect 
of such disablement or death. 
 
What is striking in this provision is that there is no reference at all to ODIMWA, 
notwithstanding the fact that COIDA was enacted more than twenty years after 
ODIMWA. Had the legislature intended for ODIMWA to entitle employees to be 
covered under COIDA, it would have been easy for it to have included references to 
ODIMWA, but it has not done so. 
 
It is, of course, important to be attentive to the precise language of the provision. 
What section 35(1) does in terms of the Court's interpretation is twofold. Firstly, it 
expunges the common-law claims of employees against the employer and, secondly, 
it limits an employer's liability to pay compensation save for under the Act. It 
expressly states that no liability for compensation on the part of such an employer 
shall arise save under the provisions of this Act. 
 
It limits the employer's liability to pay compensation to liability under COIDA alone. 
That, in the Court's view, is an indication that both parts of the provision apply only to 
those employees covered by "the provisions of this Act"; namely, COIDA. Secondly, 
the Court emphasised that, if the language of section 35(1) is unclear, this Court 
would be entitled to have regard to the heading to determine its meaning. However, 
in the Court's view the language is clear, even without the heading. Section 35(1) 
substitutes COIDA compensation for other legal remedies and no more. Neither this 
provision nor any other in the relevant statute refers to compensation under 
ODIMWA. 
 
According to the Court, the compensation provisions of ODIMWA and COIDA are 
separate but contiguous. While section 100(1) of ODIMWA precludes "double-
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dipping" on the part of employees who qualify for compensation because of 
having contracted a disease that is listed under both ODIMWA and COIDA, 
section 100(2) of ODIMWA goes further and specifically precludes employees 
with claims in respect of compensatable diseases under ODIMWA from claiming 
any COIDA benefits in respect of the same disease. It is difficult to see how 
section 100(2), while removing employees from COIDA compensation, could at 
the same time render section 35(1) applicable to them. Thirdly, the court 
analysed the comparison between COIDA and ODIMWA (see discussion at 2.4.1 
below). 
 
The Constitutional Court's decision in the Mankayi case, in my opinion, has far-
reaching consequences for employers, and also in the area of occupational 
health and safety. The Constitutional Court in this case should be commended 
for adopting a far-reaching and innovative way of developing the common law 
(discussed below). The Court's approach in developing the common law is 
informed by section 39(2) of the Constitution, which empowers the Court, when 
interpreting any legislation and when developing common law or customary law, 
to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.  
 
This decision by the Constitutional Court imposes a duty on courts to ensure 
that, when faced with the task of developing common law, they do so in line with 
the Constitution.33 The Court's decision moreover imposes a duty on the courts 
to give effect to the tenets of the Bill of Rights. The Court developed the 
common-law rule in this decision, which resulted in the Respondent being made 
liable for the damages as a result of the exposure by the Applicant to harmful 
dusts and gases in consequence of which he contracted diseases in the form of 
tuberculosis and chronic obstructive airways disease, which have rendered him 
unable to work as a mineworker or in any other occupation. 
 
The importance of this decision is extensive. It will surely change the way in 
which the courts deal with cases relating to compliance with occupational health 
and safety laws. It also deals successfully with the right to the freedom and 
                                                 
33  Section 39(2) Constitution. 
CI TSHOOSE                                                                            PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
 
244 / 261 
 
security of a person as enshrined in the Constitution.34 
 
In this regard the Court referred to the matter of Law Society of South Africa and 
Others v Minister for Transport and Another.35 In this case, the Court held that 
the abolition by the legislature of the common-law claim to sue a driver of a 
motor vehicle for negligent injury implicated the right enshrined in section 
12(1)(c) and had to pass muster under the limitations provisions of the Bill of 
Rights.36 Similarly, the Court remarked that this same constitutional right finds 
expression in the legislation that seeks to regulate the safety of the mining 
industry, the Mine Health and Safety Act 29 of 1996 and the regulations 
prescribed thereunder. 
 
2.4 The protection of mineworkers against occupational injuries and 
diseases in South Africa 
 
There are various sources which regulate occupational injuries and diseases. The 
International Labour Organisation has a number of conventions concerning 
employment injuries and diseases.37 In South Africa a constitutional imperative 
regarding occupational health and safety exists.38 Collective agreements can also 
contain arrangements relevant to social security and health and safety at the 
workplace. 
 
The primary legislation in South Africa which provides for preventative measures are 
Occupational Health and Safety Act,39 and the Mine Health and Safety Act,40 while 
                                                 
34  Section 12 Constitution. 
35  Law Society of South Africa v Minister of Transport 2011 1 SA 400 (CC). 
36  Mankayi case paras 75-78. 
37  They include Convention on Minimum Standards of Social Security 102 of 1952, and the 
Convention on Benefits in the Case of Employment Injury 121 of 1964. 
38  Section 24 Constitution states that everyone has the right to a safe working environment that 
promotes personal health and well-being. To put this in perspective, employers must identify 
workplace hazards, assess the potential risks stemming from these hazards and take appropriate 
action, which includes informing employees of the safety measures and risks associated with 
their workplace. For a detailed discussion on the employer's common law duties see Tshoose 
2011 JICLT 166-171. 
39  Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993 (hereafter referred to as OHSA). 
40  Mine Health and Safety Act 29 of 1996 (hereafter referred to as MHSA). 
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the most important legislation that regulates compensation for employees' injuries 
and diseases (and even death) suffered and contracted at work is the COIDA.41 
 
There is also the ODIMWA,42 which provides for mandatory reporting and the 
payment of certain benefits to mineworkers who develop certain occupational lung 
diseases, as well as the payment of certain benefits for the dependants of workers 
who die from such diseases. The Road Accident Fund Act43 is applicable where an 
employee is injured while being conveyed by a motor vehicle in the course of his 
employment. In cases of commuting injuries, COIDA and the RAF Act must be read 
together. For the purposes of this contribution, however, the discussion is confined to 
COIDA, OHSA, and ODIMWA. 
 
It is also important to note that the OHSA and the Mines Health and Safety Act are 
aimed at ensuring the health and safety of employees at the workplace. In essence, 
these statutes serve a truly preventative purpose in the sense that they strive to 
prevent the contraction of diseases or injuries by employees. Similarly, COIDA and 
ODIMWA deal with the aftermath of injury or disease, i.e. the payment of 
compensation to the injured employee. 
 
The purpose of workers' compensation legislation was pointed out by Price J in R v 
Canquan44 when he remarked: 
 
[Such legislation] is designed to protect the interests of employees and to safeguard 
their rights, and its effect is to limit the common-law rights of the employers and to 
enlarge the common-law rights of employees. The history of social legislation 
discloses that for a considerable number of years there has been progressive 
encroachment on the rights of employers in the interests of workmen and all 
employees. So much has this been the purpose of social legislation that employees 
have been prevented from contracting to their detriment. They have been prohibited 
from consenting to accept conditions of employment which the legislature has 
considered are too onerous and burdensome from their point of view. 
 
In addition, COIDA is wider in scope than the Workmen's Compensation Act, which it 
replaced in 1993. Compensation is payable only if the accident which caused the 
                                                 
41  COIDA. 
42  ODIMWA. 
43  Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 (hereafter referred to as the RAF Act). 
44  R v Canquan 1956 3 SA 355 (E) 357-358. 
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injury, illness or death occurred within the scope of the employee's employment and 
was not predictable. No payments are made in respect of temporary disabilities of 
three days or less.45 
 
It is common that in most social security systems, even where a completely unified 
scheme for disability exists, a separate and more favourable scheme for industrial 
injuries is often retained. Occupational injury and disease benefits are not simply 
granted or allocated; they are bought through insurance contributions. Employees 
make available their labour to the employer who benefits from it financially. It is 
therefore accepted that the responsibility of financing such an insurance scheme 
rests with employers. In return, a statutory provision, such as section 35 of COIDA, 
replaces an employer's delictual liability towards the employee with insurance cover.  
 
2.4.1 Comparison between COIDA and ODIMWA on the levels of compensation  
 
The comparison between ODIMWA and COIDA compensation is aimed at proving 
that a person compensated under COIDA for an occupational disease is in a much 
better position than another person suffering from the same disease but who is 
compensated under ODIMWA. The Court, before coming to its conclusion, first 
compared the compensation payable under COIDA and ODIMWA respectively. 
 
In terms of COIDA, an employee who suffers from an occupational disease is 
entitled to compensation in terms of Chapter VII of COIDA, which is headed 
"Occupational diseases".46 However, this Chapter does not exclusively concern itself 
with the mechanism for compensation, but sets out general principles. Section 65(6) 
of COIDA provides that the sections of COIDA regarding an accident apply "mutatis 
mutandis" to any occupational disease in relation to which there is a right to 
compensation in terms of COIDA.47 It is therefore necessary to revert to Chapter VI 
of COIDA, which is concerned with compensation for accidents. The court used the 
term "occupational disease" as used in Chapter VII. Employees who suffer from 
occupational diseases are not compensated in respect of the disease itself but for 
                                                 
45  Grogan Workplace Law 9. 
46  Sections 65-70 COIDA. 
47  Set out in s 65(1) read with Schedule 3 COIDA. 
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temporary total disablement, temporary partial disablement and permanent 
disablement. 
 
An employee who incurs temporary total disablement as from 1 April 201048 would 
be entitled to receive up to 75 percent of his/her monthly earnings subject to a 
maximum of R16 400 and a minimum of R2 100 per month.49 The employer must 
pay this amount for the first three months of disability after which the Fund or the 
mutual association concerned takes over.50 The employee is entitled to 75 percent of 
his/her monthly earnings for a maximum period of 24 months,51 but this period may 
be extended in certain circumstances.52 This is particularly relevant to the ODIMWA 
comparison, which is made later, in that an employee who receives 75 percent  of 
his/her monthly earnings for 24 months will in effect receive a total of one-and–a-half 
times his/her annual earnings and will return to work after that. 
 
Employees who suffer permanent disability for the purposes of COIDA as a result of 
an occupational disease are in a much better position than the ones restricted to 
ODIMWA compensation. They are compensated according to the degree of their 
disability. The following examples, which were analysed by the court, demonstrate 
the gap between COIDA and ODIMWA in many respects: 
 
(a) Employees who have a permanent disability of 30 percent are entitled 
to a lump sum of 15 times their monthly salary; that is to say, one-and-a 
quarter times their annual salary subject, as at 1 April 2010, to a 
minimum lump sum of R45 800 and a maximum of R183 400.53 By 
contrast, the Applicant, who was diagnosed as suffering from a 
compensatable disease which rendered him completely unemployable, 
received a total of R16 320 under ODIMWA as calculated in 2005. 
Under COIDA he would have received R24 480 if he had been found to 
have been permanently disabled to a degree of 30 percent in 2005. 
                                                 
48  The maximum and minimum amounts claimable are changed from time to time, but other details 
remain the same. For example see GN 304 in GG 33118 of 21 April 2010. 
49  Section 47(1) and (2) COIDA read with item 1 of Schedule 4. 
50  Section 47(3)(b) COIDA. 
51  Section 47(5) COIDA. 
52  Section 48(2) COIDA. 
53  Item 2 of Schedule 4 COIDA. 
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(b) Employees who suffer a 100 percent permanent disability are entitled 
to a monthly pension of 75 percent of their monthly salaries subject, as 
at 1 April 2010, to a minimum monthly pension of R2 300 and a 
maximum of R16 400.54  The Applicant would have received a 
minimum monthly pension of R1 224 under COIDA from 2005 and 
would by now have received in excess of R70 000 if he had been found 
to have been permanently disabled in 2005. There is also a provision 
for the payment of a lump sum to this category of employee in certain 
circumstances.55 
 
The dependant of an employee who dies as a result of an occupational disease 
would essentially receive in effect a lump sum of twice the monthly pension (a 
minimum of R4 600 as at 1 April 2010).56 The dependants would secondly benefit 
from a monthly pension of 40 percent of the amount that would have been payable to 
the employee had the employee been 100 percent permanently disabled.57 Thirdly, 
the Director-General would have to pay the employee's funeral costs subject to a 
maximum of R12 300 as at 1 April 2010.58 Moreover, if the employer was negligent, 
the employee would receive more money and could in fact be compensated for 
his/her total financial loss.59 This concludes the overview of COIDA benefits in 
respect of occupational diseases. 
 
The Court interpreted the relevant provisions of ODIMWA to the extent that it relates 
to COIDA. The Court emphasised that ODIMWA becomes applicable when an 
occupational disease is classified as a "compensatable disease". One would have 
expected the benefits under ODIMWA to be more or less the same or somewhat 
more than under COIDA, but the opposite is the case. Except for a person suffering 
from tuberculosis, who is entitled to 75 percent of his monthly earnings when ill,60 the 
only benefits payable to a person who is suffering from a compensatable disease 
                                                 
54  Section 49(1) COIDA read with item 4 of Schedule 4. 
55  Section 52 COIDA. 
56  Section 54(1)(a) COIDA read with item 6 of Schedule 4. 
57  Section 54(1)(b) COIDA read with item 7 of Schedule 4. 
58  Section 54(2) COIDA read with item 10 of Schedule 4. 
59  Section 56(4)(b) COIDA. 
60  Section 80(1) ODIMWA. 
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contracted as a result of risk work is a lump sum which amounts to approximately 
one and one third of his annual salary61 if that employee suffers from a 
compensatable disease in the first degree, and about three times his annual salary62 
if the compensatable disease is in the second degree.63 
 
There is no provision for the payment of funeral expenses, or any lump sum or 
pension for dependants. The statute does, however, make provision for the 
dependants of a person who died of a compensatable disease to receive the lump 
sum that would have been payable to that person had he not died.64 In other words, 
where the person suffering from a compensatable disease has been paid the lump 
sum, the dependants get nothing even if they are children. To make matters worse, 
the person who finds himself afflicted with a compensatable disease merely because 
of legislative classification has no right to claim additional damages even if the 
employer was negligent, a right that is reserved for employees who suffer 
occupational diseases. 
 
With this in mind, according to the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
erred in concluding that it is not possible to compare the two provisions. This is 
despite the fact that the differences between the compensatory regimes of COIDA 
and ODIMWA are quite apparent. A person whose disease is certified as a 
compensatable disease loses all the benefits of COIDA and receives much less 
under ODIMWA.65 The purpose is obviously to reduce the burden on the COIDA 
fund by converting an occupational disease into a compensatable disease. This 
means that the person benefits to a considerably lesser degree from another fund to 
which the employer makes a contribution and a much smaller contribution at that, 
because of the smaller benefits payable. The saving to the employer arising out of 
the redefinition of the disease amounts to a reduction in the contribution to the 
COIDA fund, which exceeds the amounts to be paid to facilitate the lesser 
compensation under ODIMWA. It must be emphasised that an employee who has a 
claim under ODIMWA has to be excluded from its scope of coverage. The drastic 
                                                 
61  Section 80(2)(a) ODIMWA, which provides for 1.31 of an annual salary. 
62  Section 80(2)(b)(i) ODIMWA, which provides for 2.917 of an annual salary. 
63  Section 80(2)(b)(i) ODIMWA. 
64  Section 80(4) ODIMWA. 
65  Mankayi case para 88. 
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reduction in his compensation is obligatory. It is therefore not surprising that 
ODIMWA is silent on the issue of common law liability.66  
 
The Court also commented on the enhanced compensation for which section 56 of 
COIDA provides where an employee contracts an occupational disease due to the 
negligence of the employer or other specified categories of related persons. 
ODIMWA has no comparable provision.67 This leaves those entitled only to ODIMWA 
compensation at a severe disadvantage. The argument that section 35(1) must be 
interpreted to exclude mineworkers' common-law claims so as to create a just and 
sensible parity in the two statutes' compensation systems is thus without merit. 
 
In its conclusion the Court held that section 35(1) must be read in the context of the 
other provisions of COIDA. The employee referred to in section 35(1) whose 
common-law claim is expunged is limited to an employee who has a claim for 
compensation under COIDA in respect of occupational diseases mentioned in 
COIDA. It is this employee that section 35(1) of COIDA excludes from instituting a 
claim for the recovery of damages against the employer for occupational diseases 
resulting in disablement or death. The expungement does not extend to an employee 
who is not entitled to claim compensation in respect of "occupational diseases" 
under COIDA. 
 
The corollary is that section 35(1) does not cover an employee who qualifies for 
compensation in respect of "compensatable diseases" under ODIMWA. The 
exclusion of liability in section 35(1) is therefore limited to employees who are 
entitled to compensation in respect of "occupational diseases" under COIDA. The 
exception raised by the Respondent should therefore have been dismissed. 
 
The consequence of the judgment is that only employees who are precluded from 
claiming under COIDA as a result of the wording of section 100 (2) may now institute 
a claim of damages against their employer. The employee will still have the onus of 
proving damages and that such damages were caused by the negligence of the 
employer. This judgment does not mean that all employees at all mines and works 
                                                 
66  Mankayi case para 88. 
67  Mankayi case para 107. 
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will always have a right to bring claims for damages against their employer in respect 
of illness suffered in the course and scope of their employment. The application of 
ODIMWA is limited to certain compensatable diseases such as tuberculosis and 
permanent obstruction of the airways. Progressive systematic sclerosis and all other 
permanent diseases of the cardio-respiratory organs are included under ODIMWA 
only if they are attributable to the performance of risk work as defined under 
ODIMWA. The category of employees who fall within the ambit of section 100(2) is 
limited to those who claim under ODIMWA on the ground that they were employed at 
a controlled mine or a controlled works. In respect of tuberculosis ODIMWA deems 
risk work at any mine or works to be risk work performed at a controlled mine or 
works. The extent to which employees have to rely on the fact that they were 
employed at a controlled mine or works in order to be entitled to benefits is further 
not clear from the wording of ODIMWA. 
 
2.5 The significance of Mankayi v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2011 32 545 (CC) 
 
The Constitutional Court's decision in the Mankayi case deemed to be relevant to the 
system of occupational health and safety based on the following reasons. Firstly, the 
Constitutional Court has developed a precedent to determine the content and 
meaning of the employer's duty of care. Phrased differently, there are yardsticks or 
standards of conduct against which the employer's conduct can be measured and 
judged. This judgment will instil some sense of accountability in employers who have 
exploited workers working under horrendous conditions for many years. Secondly, 
the judgment indicates that it is time the mines are taken to task about their 
responsibilities for the health and safety of employees in the workplaces. Lastly, the 
Mankayi case illustrates the difference in compensation that is being paid to 
employees suffering from the same occupational diseases. In short, it can be argued 
that the Mankayi case is the Court's latest and most promising innovation in the area 
of occupational health and safety. 
 
In addition, in most civil-law jurisdictions the common-law duty of care is constantly 
being refined and given meaning and content by the courts through their judgments 
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(as discussed above).68 In most countries the legislature has further refined the 
employer's duty of care by enacting health and safety legislation. In general, health 
and safety legislation is intended to give specific content to the duty of care, and to 
enhance accountability by providing for a range of additional criminal and 
administrative sanctions. 
 
One of the criticisms levelled against this decision by the Constitutional Court is that 
this case will open the floodgates to many cases against the employers. However, in 
my opinion this decision of the Constitutional Court has the potential to achieve 
legislative change, in particular with regard to the protection of miners and ex-miners 
against occupational injuries and diseases. This resonates well with the 
constitutional provision which affords everyone the right to a healthy environment.69 
 
The right to a healthy environment was first explicitly recognised as a non-binding 
principle in the 1972 Declaration of the United Nations on the Human Environment 
(the Stockholm Declaration) and the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development (the Rio Declaration). Those Declarations were not intended to create 
legal rights and obligations. However, they did contribute to the development of 
international and national law. The Stockholm Conference is considered an 
important starting point in developing environmental law at the global as well as 
national level. Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration linked environmental 
protection to human rights norms, stating: 
 
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, 
in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he 
bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present 
and future generations. 
 
Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration established a further foundation for linking 
human rights and environmental protection, declaring that Man has the fundamental 
right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a 
                                                 
68  The employer's duty of care in South Africa is the only mechanism whereby employers who 
breach the duty of care owed to their employees can be held accountable through a system of 
administrative sanctions regulated by the inspectorate and the criminal justice system. The civil 
justice system has no role to play. Indeed, it is expressly excluded. 
69  Section 24 Constitution. S 24(a) affords everyone the right to an environment that is not harmful 
to their health or well-being. 
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quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being. In resolution 45/94 the UN 
General Assembly recalled the language of Stockholm, stating that all individuals are 
entitled to live in an environment adequate for their health and well-being. The 
resolution called for enhanced efforts to ensure a better and healthier environment. 
 
The interpretation of the above legal instruments clearly indicates a paradigm shift in 
the system of occupational health and safety in South Africa. The first one relates to 
the linkage between labour law and human rights. The second one indicates that the 
system of occupational health and safety cannot operate in isolation thereby 
disregarding other fundamental rights entrenched in the Constitution. 
 
In fact, in other jurisdictions, the increased awareness of the constitutional right to a 
healthy environment has led courts to interpret the right to life as implying the right to 
a healthy environment in which to live that life. Authority illustrating this is found in 
the case of Taskin and Others v Turkey.70 This case involved challenges to the 
development and operation of a gold mine which the Applicant alleged caused 
environmental damage to the detriment of the people in the region. 
 
In deciding this case, the Turkish Supreme Administrative Court held that the 
member states must ensure appropriate protection of life, health, family, private 
property, and the human right to a healthy, viable and decent environment. In the 
second case of Tatar v Romania,71 which arose in the aftermath of an ecological 
disaster at a gold mine in Romania which resulted in high levels of sodium cyanide 
and heavy metals being released into fresh waters, the water caused pollution and 
local residents were affected. The court in its decision held that the government must 
take action to adopt reasonable and adequate measures capable of respecting the 
rights of individuals against serious risks to their health and well-being. 
 
The implementation of occupational health and safety standards in the workplace 
has been a subject of debate at an international level. To begin with, South Africa 
has ratified two key conventions relating to safety and health: the Safety and Health 
                                                 
70  Taskin v Turkey App. No. 46117/99 2004 Eur Ct Hum Rts 621. 
71  Tatar v Romania App. No. 67021/01 (judgment delivered in 27 January 2009). 
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in Mines Convention72 and the Occupational Safety and Health Convention.73The 
main objective of these conventions is to improve occupational safety and health 
conditions.74 
 
The implementation of occupational health and safety laws in South Africa leaves 
much to be desired. This is evident from the statistics of workers who die in 
accidents underground, while thousands more die of work-related diseases such as 
silicosis.75 Ladou76 argues that corporation-dominated institutions will not implement 
meaningful worker-health protection. He therefore proposes a number of strategies 
to ensure that large corporations comply with occupational health and safety 
legislation. The author indicates that institutions such as the World Trade 
Organisation, World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund can play a key role 
in the implementation of the International Labour Orgnisation Conventions relating to 
occupational safety. One of the strategies that Ladou proposes is that the WTO, 
World Bank, and IMF can require member states to provide a minimum standard of 
workers' compensation insurance for all workers. 
 
In short, multinational corporations, in particular in the area of mining, have a legal 
duty to comply with the Constitution and specifically with the provisions covering 
labour rights, environmental protection, and occupational health and safety as 
discussed above. Meeran77 argues that a duty should be imposed in respect of 
corporations operating in foreign countries to ensure that their operations do not 
violate workers rights to a safe environment. 
 
Similarly, numerous methods of imposing human rights' accountability on 
corporations would be welcome. Such accountability should include the responsibility 
of the state for the actions of those within their jurisdictions. This means that in cases 
involving the violation of occupational health and safety laws, such a state could be 
held liable in international law for human rights' violations perpetrated by private 
                                                 
72  Convention on the Safety and Health in Mines 176 of 1995. 
73  Convention on Occupational Safety and Health 155 of 1981. 
74  Wilson 2007 Journal of Occupational Health 72-79. 
75  SIMRAC 2003 researchspace.csir.co.za 24. 
76  Ladou 2005 IJOEH 210-211. 
77  Meeran 2000 IJOEH 249-254. 
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entities, including corporations.78 Finally, the proposals for the inclusion of a human 
rights' (social clause) exception to free trade provisions under the WTO regime 
would improve compliance with occupational health and safety legislation. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
In the Mankayi case, the Constitutional Court was called upon to give meaning and 
content by interpreting the provision whereby employees qualify for compensation for 
occupational injuries or diseases, either in terms of COIDA or ODIMWA, to 
determine whether or not their common-law right of recourse against their employers 
in cases where they sustain occupational injuries or contract occupational diseases 
is extinguished by virtue of section 35(1) of COIDA. 
 
The Court noted that compensation under ODIMWA is far less generous and 
comprehensive than that afforded under COIDA and concluded that the exclusion of 
common-law liability in section 35(1) is limited to those employees entitled to 
compensation under COIDA. According to the Court, to hold otherwise would strain 
the plain meaning of the language in section 35(1). In its judgment the Court 
unanimously held that mineworkers who have contracted compensatable diseases 
under ODIMWA retain their common-law right to claim against their employers. 
 
The above analysis has endeavoured to show the role that the Constitutional Court 
has played in protecting miners against occupational diseases. For that reason it is 
argued that the Constitutional Court has developed a precedent to determine the 
content and meaning of the employer's duty of care. This means there are yardsticks 
or standards of conduct against which employers' conduct can be measured and 
judged. This judgment will instil accountability in employers who have exploited 
workers for many years by expecting them to work under horrendous conditions. 
Secondly, the judgment indicates that it is time that mine owners were held to 
account for their responsibilities for the health and safety of their employees in the 
workplace. 
 
                                                 
78  Kinley and Joseph 2002 Alt LJ 7-10. 
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In addition, in most civil-law jurisdictions the common-law duty of care is constantly 
being refined and given meaning and content by the courts through their judgments 
(as discussed above).79 In most countries the legislature has further refined the 
employer's duty of care by enacting health and safety legislation. In general, health 
and safety legislation is intended to give specific content to the duty of care and to 
enhance accountability by providing for a range of additional criminal and 
administrative sanctions. 
 
The judgment has attracted various criticisms. The critics of the Court charge it with 
"opening the flood gates" to cases against employers. However, there is a threefold 
answer to these critics. Firstly, this judgment, it is submitted, is groundbreaking in 
that it has paved the way for mineworkers to seek justice outside of the failed 
compensation system. Secondly, the decision of the Constitutional Court provides us 
with an opportunity to fight the legacy of asbestos and silicosis that has left a trail of 
health and death threats in our communities. Thirdly, the Mankayi case also 
highlights the lopsided nature of the workers' compensation laws in South Africa, 
which lean towards compensation and place little focus on human rights. On a 
positive note, the Mankayi judgment places a duty on the employer to implement 
numerous good practice solutions which will enhance safety in the workplace. 
 
In conclusion, the Mankayi case illustrates an inherent gap in the system of 
occupational health and safety in South Africa. The Committee of Inquiry into a 
National Health and Safety Council concluded that the system of compensation 
under COIDA and ODIMWA has not maximised its potential to promote preventative 
activities.80 Even though it is more cost effective to run an effective rehabilitation 
scheme than to pay long-term cash benefits to victims of occupational accidents or 
diseases, reintegration measures are not being sufficiently addressed by the relevant 
South African legislation.81 It is evident that there is a need for a unified system 
                                                 
79  The employer's duty of care in South Africa is the only mechanism whereby employers who 
breach the duty of care owed to their employees can be held accountable. In practice it is 
through a system of administrative sanctions, regulated by the inspectorate and the criminal 
justice system, that the employer can be held accountable for non-compliance with his common 
law duties. The civil justice system has no role to play. Indeed, it is expressly excluded. 
80  Olivier Social Security 491-499. 
81  COIDA requires that the employer must pay the compensation due to the injured employee for 
the first three months of temporary total disablement (s 47(3)). This could perhaps be seen as a 
measure which will ensure to some extent the continuation of the employee's link with his 
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which will address issues of occupational health and safety in a coordinated and 
unified manner. 
                                                                                                                                                        
employment. However, this remains essentially a temporary measure which is not backed by 
other (re)integration measures. 
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